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Working between Two Worlds 
Qualitative Methods and Psychology 
• • 
Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
THE HEART OF A QUALITATIVE STANCE is the desire to make sense 
of lived experience. All three of us were originally trained in experimental 
and quantitative methods; we came to a qualitative stance by working in 
places where cultural difference squarely confronted us: in Sri Lanka, 
India, and Japan and in urban schools in the United States. In these set­
tings, we had little choice but to work inductively. The ways that people 
understood their world and moved about in it were foreign to us as out­
siders. We learned to use perplexing encounters, strained interactions, and 
the inevitable faux pas as peepholes into worlds different from our own. We 
were led to a qualitative stance by our need to understand experiences that 
were different from our own, and lives that moved to music we didn't hear. 
Qualitative Inquiry and Social Issues: 
Reclaiming a History 
Although such methods are currently relegated to the margins of social 
psychology in the United States, several classic studies used field-based 
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30 Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
qualitative approaches. In the 1930s, John Dollard conducted field-based, 
qualitative work on race and class relations. A researcher in the psychology 
department at Yale~ Dollard went south to learn how race operated within 
the social life of a town he called "Southerntown." He was a participant-
observer and an outsider, a northern white psychologist naive about south-
ern race relations . He recognized that his naivete necessitated that he be 
educated by his data: 
This social sharing was of two degrees and involved two roles: there was 
first the casual participation possible as a "Yankee down here studying Ne-
groes" and second the more intensive participation and the more specific 
role of the life history taker. ... The primary research instrument would 
seem to be the o bserving human intelligence trying to make sense of the 
experience; and the experience was full of problems and uncertainty in 
fact. Perhaps it does not compare well with more objective-seeming in-
struments, such as a previously prepared set of questions but as to this 
question the reader can judge for himself. It has the value of offering to 
perception the actual, natural human contact with all of the real feelings 
present and unguarded. (1937, 18) 
At the heart of Dollard's work is~his qualitative stance: His desire to 
make sense of "human contact with all of the real feelings present and 
unguarded." Although Dollard headed south with a research agenda, 
his field of variables was not specified in advance. He could gather data 
that moved across the terrain of racial, political, and economic hierar-
chies of the South. 
In the 1950s, Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif and their coworkers im-
mersed themselves in the rivalries of boys at a summer camp (Sherif et al. 
1961 ). Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schacter (1956) infil-
trated a doomsday sect to observe what happens when prophecies fail. 
Philip Zimbardo and his students examined de-individuation in a mock 
prison (Zimbardo et al. 1975). David Rosenhan (1973) and a group of 
colleagues and students entered a mental hospital by feigning hallucina-
tions. All these researchers explicated nuances and textures of real life. 
They explored their biases and worried about ethics and relationships in 
the field. Nonetheless, no one doubted that they were doing psychologi-
cal research. 
A qualitative stance invites broad-based inquiry into spaces that are un-
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Working between Two Worlds 31 
documented in other studies. Unlike a hypothetico-deductive stance, in 
which a fixed set of hypotheses constrains the field of investigation, a qual-
itative stance allows researchers to pry open territory about which they 
have only vague hunches. Instead of specifying at the outset the variables 
whose main effects and interactions will be tracked, qualitative workers 
begin with a period of exploration and immersion. They enter the field 
without structured questionnaires, predetermined variables, or research 
designs; only later do they narrow their focus . Propelled by a desire to 
know what is unknown, to unravel mysteries, to be surprised and jostled 
by what turns up, qualitative researchers embark on an intellectual adven-
ture without a map or even a clear destination. This way of working re-
quires giving up control, going along for the ride, not always having hold 
of the steering wheel-and still taking good notes. 
Qualitative Work and "Bias" 
When we peer into the cubbyholes and crevices where qualitative work in 
psychology has been stuffed, we find researchers admitting and apologiz-
ing for their "biases." Reflecting on his experiences as a pseudopatient, 
David Rosenhan wrote in Science about how stunned he was by the depths 
of depersonalization provoked by his short stay: 
I 
$·. 
Neither anecdotal nor "hard" data can convey the overwhelming sense of 
powerlessness which invades the individual as he is continually exposed to 
the depersonalization of the psychiatric hospital. . . . 
I and the other pseudopatients in the psychiatric setting had distinc-
tively negative reactions. We do not pretend to describe the subjective ex> 
periences of true patients. Theirs may be different from ours, particularly 
with the passage of time and the necessary process of adaptation to one's 
environment. But we can and do speak to the relatively more objective in-
dicators of treatment within the hospital. It would be a mistake and a very 
unfortunate one to consider that what happened to us derived from mal-
ice or stupidity on the part of the staff. Quite the contrary, our over-
whelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who were 
committed, and who were uncommonly intelligent. Where they failed, as 
they sometimes did painfully, it would be more accurate to attribute those 
failures to the environment in which they, too, found themselves than to 
personal callousness. (1973, 265,268) 
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3 2 Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
Rosenhan is here confessing what he calls an "overwhelming impression." 
His personal experience dramatizes the power of institutional arrange-
ments over both the good will of the staff and the sanity of the residents. 
Without his self-reflective experience as participant and observer inside the 
institution, Rosenhan's work would have lacked the passion and much of 
the evidence that makes it so compelling. 
Self-reflection and acknowledgment of subjectivity are now intrinsic to 
scholarship in many intellectual domains, but they have not yet become so 
in psychology. Yet critical self-reflection is not a new idea in social psy-
chology. Nearly fifty years ago, the Sherifs had this to say: 
The research man [sic] has his own group identifications. We have noted that 
every group represents a point of view as it stands in relation to other groups. 
Every group has its own explicit or implicit premises as to the nature of 
human relations, as to the directions that the values and goals of group rela-
tions should take. From the outset, research and generalizations are doomed 
to be deflections or mere justifications of the point of view and premises of 
the group or groups with which one identifies himself, if one does not start 
his work by clear, deliberate recognition and neutralizing of his personal in-
volvement in these issues. If this painful process of deliberate recognition 
and neutralizing of one's own personal involvements is not achieved, his 
autism will greatly influence his design of the study and his collection and 
treatment of data. (1953, 11) 
This acknowledgment of personal involvements was largely forgotten in 
the ensuing decades, as was the injunction that researchers reflect on their 
positions and allegiances. Instead, we psychologists came to trust that 
proper scientific methods would protect us from our "autisms." Further, 
we came to believ:: that such methods would yield what Donna Haraway 
(1988) called the "god's-eye view of reality," a view uninfluenced by the 
vantage point of onlooker. However, denying the biases inherent in the 
privileged position of a researcher does not negate them. 
Qualitative Work: On Listening and Words 
A psychology concerned with social life should attend to people's words 
and their meaning (Billig 1994). Social relations are constituted and man-
.i 
/ 
) 
Vi 
LI 
' E 
l 
:l2 
.z 
,L 
( 
.. 
• 
~ 
Working between Two Worlds I 33 
aged through language. As the medium of social negotiations about truth 
and reality, language thus determines what we see and know. When re-
searchers restrict participants to speaking only in our terms, we lose access 
to theirs. When researchers use structured attitude scales, inventories, and 
tests, the respondents' standpoints are located on dimensions of the re-
searchers' making. 
In contrast, a qualitative stance involves listening to and theorizing 
about what emerges when people use their own words to make sense of 
their lived experience. It requires paying attention to the lexicon partici-
pants use and to the interpretive repertoire upon which they draw (Pot-
ter and Wetherell 1987); it involves interpreting silences, gaps in a nar-
rative, or the absence of a language for certain things (Visweswaran 
1994). By working with people's own words, we hope to bring into so-
cial psychology's purview rich stories of relationships, struggles, despair, 
and engagements. 
Our own projects illustrate how people use words to connect to, repro-
duce, resist, and transform the contexts in which they live. Jeanne Mare-
eek and Diane Kravetz, in their study of feminist therapists, have asked 
how feminist therapists' identities and ideas about their work have shifted 
under the pressures of the antifeminist backlash of the 1990s (Marecek and 
Kravetz 1998a). Only two of the eighty-nine therapists they interviewed 
could label themselves publicly as feminist therapists, although many said 
that they had openly embraced that title in the past. Some took pains to 
conceal their feminist identity even from clients in ongoing therapy. 
Nonetheless, feminism remained central to their work and their personal 
identities. Some managed this tension between the public and private by 
discursively erasing the boundary between feminist therapy and therapy in 
general, equating feminist ideals with norms of "good mental health" and 
"common sense" and feminist therapy with "just good therapy." As one 
therapist said, "I can't imagine that anyone could be an effective healthy 
therapist without being a feminist therapist." Some demarcated themselves 
as feminists who were exempt from the objectionable stereotypes of femi-
nists with statements like "I don't stuff it down people's throats," "I'm 
pretty gentle," and "I like men" (Marecek and Kravetz 1998b ). This 
rhetorical strategy is double-edged, inadvertently lending credence to the 
very stereotypes it seems to challenge. 
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34 Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
Susan Condor (1986) described her discontent with work that surveyed 
nonfeminist or right-wing women merely to reaffirm the obvious: that 
"they" were not "us." She implored feminist researchers to engage with 
qualitative methods, to listen to the words of participants. She challenged 
feminist colleagues to dare to learn how right-wing women made sense of 
the world. We extend and broaden Condor's challenge: Dare we learn how 
those who are not "us"-who are impoverished, or mentally ill, or urban 
teenagers, or even just nonpsychologists-make sense of the world? And 
do we dare learn how they are "us"? 
Working as a rape crisis volunteer, Michelle Fine (1983) met a young 
African-American woman, Altamese, who had been gang raped. They 
spent many hours talking in the hospital. Michelle describes their en-
counter in retrospect: "I realize now that I was trying to talk her into 
ways of coping. I doused her with all that I as a feminist counselor, 
white academic, and social psychologist, believed would be good for 
her: Report them, tell your social worker, let your family know, don't 
keep it in .... " 
At some point, Altamese had enough of Michelle's advice and let her 
know that she would not press charges, nor would she let her family know 
what happened. In her community, an African-American neighborhood in 
North Philadelphia, the police might not believe her. If she told her broth-
ers, they might go out and kill the perpetrators. Telling a therapist might 
help briefly, but she would still carry the pain inside. When Michelle 
stopped talking and listened to Altamese's story, she could hear her way of 
making sense of and surviving in a world where neither the justice system 
nor the streets were trustworthy; where protecting her mother, brothers, 
and children was more important than abstract notions of justice. Michele 
could have measured Altamese's degree of learned helplessness, her attri-
butional biases, or her external locus of control. Instead, she listened and 
was thereby able to hear how racism, poverty, and personal and cultural 
circumstances made a profound difference in her and Altamese's responses 
to a gang rape. 
When researchers listen with close attention to what respondents say, 
the respondents become active agents, the creators of the worlds they in-
habit and the interpreters of their experiences. And as researchers become 
witnesses, bringing their knowledge of theory and their interpretive meth-
ods to participants' stories, they too become active agents . 
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Qualitative Work: From the Ground Up 
Qualitative approaches are less formulaic than orthodox psychology meth-
ods. Researchers may alter their approach and even their initial hypotheses 
upon discovering that something else works better. For instance, when 
Louise Kidder ( 1992) began interviewing Japanese students who were 
"returnees," she asked students who had lived outside of Japan to talk 
about what it was like to live abroad and to return to Japan. She began with 
a series of open-ended questions in a structured interview schedule. No 
sooner had she begun than she discovered that it was much more effective 
to let the students talk without interruption. Their stories centered on 
what it was like to return to Japan and find they were no longer considered 
"really" Japanese. Their body language and attitudes marked them as "re-
turnees." Listening to these stories, Louise began to discern the require-
ments for "being Japanese." 
For conventionally trained psychologists, switching to a qualitative 
stance can induce vertigo; many of the usual methodological props are 
pulled away. Qualitative researchers search through transcripts or field 
notes for the glimmer of a pattern instead of coding structured data sets. 
They pore over what other psychologists might consider "error vari-
ance" and "uncodable" responses, awaiting inspiration and serendipi-
tous realizations: 
The practices of qualitative work stand in sharp contrast to those we 
were taught in graduate school. We learned to defer data collection until 
we had clearly specified our hypotheses, operationalized our variables, 
pilot-tested our measures, and specified our coding and analytic strategies. 
We maintained tight control over research outcomes, strictly limiting what 
participants could do or say. Structured interviews and questionnaires pro-
vided predetermined options for responding, typically phrased in a stan-
dard format stripped of nuance and local meaning ( e.g., Agree, Somewhat 
Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree ... ). Our participants could register 
experiences that we researchers were not ready to hear only by scribbling 
in the margins of a questionnaire, amending a question before answering 
it, or using the option marked "Other: ___ " Typically such efforts at 
communication were ignored or even considered "uncodable." 
We learned to stand at a safe distance from those we studied, running 
them through procedures designed to extract data from them. Research 
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36 Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
was not a shared, intersubjective activity. This stance is akin to what Robert 
Stolorow calls "the theory of the isolated mind" (Atwood and Stolorow 
1984). Such a stance makes it hard to learn the participants' point of view, 
as Joyce Ladner notes: 
The relationship between researcher and his subjects, by definition, resem-
bles that of the oppressor and the oppressed, because it is the oppressor who 
defines the problem, the nature of the research, and to some extent, the 
quality of interaction between him and hi subjects . ... This inability to un-
derstand and research the fundamental problcm- ncocolonialism- prcvcnts 
most social researchers from being able accurately to observe and analyze 
Black life and culture and the impact that racism and oppression have on 
Blacks. (1971, vii) 
Qualitative Research: Social Life and Power 
Michel Foucault (1980) has observed that modern societies regulate their 
citizens without brute force, relying instead on self-discipline and self-sur-
veillance. Power in these circumstances is diffuse; it operates "from 
below," flowing through social relations, knowledge structures, and 
regimes of truth that justify existing hierarchies. To grasp how power from 
below operates, we need to listen to the negotiated narratives of power 
that flow through streets and gutters; to situate our research in mundane 
conversations and practices; to see how people are situated in and by insti-
tutional contexts, and how they maneuver to resituate themselves 
(Guinier, Fine, and Balin 1997; Smith 1987). 
During a sojourn in India, Louise (Kidder, forthcoming) studied expa-
triates' conversations with one another about their domestic servants. She 
noted that expatriates occupied the elevated status of "masters," enjoying 
a status and benefits that exceeded what they experienced back home. In-
stead of making Indian friends and learning Indian ways of living, they be-
came part of an expatriate subculture and found their friends among oth-
ers like themselves. As wealthy, white foreigners, they occupied the out-
sider's position of privilege and power. But being relatively unacquainted 
with Indian culture and society, they were also dependent on domestic ser-
vants for cultural knowledge and daily living skills. The relationship of 
master to servant was not simply hierarchical; power and dependency were 
intertwined. As Albert Memmi says, "[t]he dominant person isn't always 
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the least dependent one" (1984, 8). An American woman's story illus-
trates her family's dependence on their Indian cook: 
We discovered that we were poisoning (my husband] right in our own 
kitchen. I wasn't getting sick at all, but he had something all the time . ... 
Finally, we realized that he was eating sandwiches and I wasn't-and it must 
have been the mayonnaise that (the cook] was making. I don't know if it was 
a batch of bad eggs or what, but that was doing it. He was getting poisoned 
in our own house! (Kidder 1997, 164) 
Jeanne's work in Sri Lanka has concerned that country's dramatic up-
surge in suicide deaths. Among Sri Lankans, interpersonal conflicts often 
trigger suicidal acts, particularly when loss of honor, face, status, or respect 
is at stake. As a social practice, suicidal acts serve to reestablish one's right-
ful place in the hierarchy or to redress a grievance by pointing the finger of 
blame toward those who are at fault. (Marecek 1997). In one project, 
Jeanne studied news reports of official inquiries into suicide deaths, asking 
how these reports reasserted interpretive authority over the death ( Mare-
eek 199 5). Among other things, she found that if suicide victims were in 
subordinate positions, the news reports emphasized their emotional state, 
especially the culturally disapproved emotions of anger and desire for re-
venge. The instigating actions of higher-status individuals (e.g., beatings 
by one's husband; coercion or extortion by a petty government officer) 
were mentioned perfunctorily and put aside. In contrast, if the victim was 
the higher-status party, the texts emphasized the instigating actions of 
the other ( e.g., a daughter who eloped; a drunken son; a disobedient wife) 
or impersonal societal forces (e.g., poverty; unemployment) . For higher-
status victims, emotional state was not a focus. Thus, the news reports 
worked to concentrate moral opprobrium on lower-status parties and de-
flect it from higher-status ones. 
In the United States, Louise studied the negotiation of meaning be-
tween a hypnotist and her subjects (Kidder 1972). Enrolled as a partici-
pant in a hypnosis workshop, Louise recorded not only the hypnotic in-
ductions but also the arguments that ensued when participants said such 
things as "I don't think I was really in a trance." Her analyses focused on 
how the hypnotist and doubting participants negotiated what hypnosis is 
and what makes someone a good or bad hypnotic subject. The frameworks 
for Louise's analysis-attribution and social learning theory-come from 
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38 Jeanne Marecek, Michelle Fine, and Louise Kidder 
the heart of social psychology. She explored the process by wh.ich the hyp-
notist and the workshop participants allocated blame when omeone failed 
to go into trance. She also documented how the hypnotist meted out 
praise to compliant participants and punishment to d ubtel' . Louise's 
work illuminated both the power of language to define participants' real-
ity and how that discursive power wa n -t evenly distributed in that ocial 
situation. 
Rigorous qualitative research .involves attention to context, mean-
ings, and power relations in data collection and analysis. Qualitative re-
searchers situate words, discourses, persons, relations, and groups within 
local, societal, and sometimes global contexts. Such an approach enables 
a study of power relations that more conventional psychological meth-
ods of study, such as individual-difference testing or laboratory experi-
mentation, preclude. 
Qualitative Work and Ethical Shadows 
In conversations that swirl around qualitative work, issues of ethics and re-
sponsibility surface that go far beyond the formal American Psychologi al 
Association (APA) ethical guidelines. Why is qualitative work the Lightning 
rod for such concerns? We contend that it is time for all psychoJogi r to 
talk seriously about why we do the work we do, whom we choose as our 
participant , and at which constituencies our work i aimed. Ar we will-
ing to engage the variety of standpoints that exist in any i.ngle context? 
How much do our own standpoints shape which ·t ries we are told , which 
ones we are able to hear, which ones we take to be data, and which ones 
we don't? What are the ethics of studying "down" and thus, deliberately 
or not, replicating a focus on people too often held responsible for social-
structural decay? Whether we study "down" or "up," what are the ethi<;:s 
of telling or not telling participants what we are really up tor To what ex-
tent do we anticipate the political and ethical implications of our work? Do 
we have an obligation to do so? In an interview, Kenneth Clark reflected 
on ethical concerns that he and Mamie Clark had about their research on 
black children's self-images: 
"We were really disturbed by our findings," Kenneth Clark recalls, "and we 
sat on them for a number of years. What was surprising was the degree to 
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which the children suffered from self-rejection, with its truncating effect on 
their personalities, and the earliness of the corrosive awareness of color. I 
don't think we quite realiz1:d the extent of the cruelty of racism and how 
hard it hit ... . Some of these children, particularly in the North, were re-
duced to crying when presented with the [black] dolls and asked to identify 
with them. They looked at me as if I were the devil for putting them in this 
predicament. Let me tell you, it was a traumatic experience for me as well." 
(Kluger 1975, quoted in Cross 1991, 29) 
Clark worried about the impact of his research on the children and on 
the community in general. His research methods were not qualitative, but 
his ethical concerns-expressed in the interview, but not in his research 
text-are ones that often emerge in qualitative work. 
The ethical issues that surface in qualitative research go beyond pre-
serving the rights of individual participants. They are not put to rest by 
scrupulous adherence to procedures for informed consent, anonymity, and 
confidentiality. Participants in qualitative studies may demand to know 
"who owns the data?" This is an ethical question that participants in labo-
ratory studies do not think to ask. Whose interpretation counts? Who has 
veto power? What will happen to the relationships that were formed dur-
ing the research? What are the researcher's obligations after the data are 
collected? Can the data be used against the participants? Will the data be 
used on their behalf? Do researchers have an obligation to protect the 
communities and social groups they study, or just to guard certain rights 
ofindividuals? Such questions reveal how much ethical terrain is uncharted 
by APA guidelines and institutional review boards. It is qualitative re-
searchers who are wrestling with such ethical dilemmas, but the dilemmas 
are present in much psychological research, regardless of the researcher's 
methodological commitments. 
Conclusion 
Our enthusiasm for qualitative work notwithstanding, we sometimes have 
crises of identity and loyalty: Are we still psychologists? What is at stake in 
that identity? Apart from its methods, what is psychology? Why is the dis-
ciplinary boundary now drawn where it is? Should one be drawn at all? 
We have a sense of urgency in asking why psychology in the United 
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States lags so far behind our international and interdisciplinary colleagues 
in developing qualitative methods. As John Richardson notes, 
There is a great deal of scope for psychologists in North America to catch up 
with their counterparts in the UK and with their compatriots in the other so-
cial sciences in terms of their understanding and appreciation of qualitative 
research methods. (1996, 8) 
We do not claim that qualitative methods are new or radical or neces-
sarily progressive. We do not claim that qualitative work is the only eman-
cipatory approach or that such work always yields emancipatory results. 
Any research strategy can be used for emancipatory or repressive ends. Our 
goal here has been to give evidence of a rich history of and vibrant future 
for qualitative work in psychology. In doing so, we hope we have laid a 
strong bridge on which psychologists can walk between worlds. 
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